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Courts-Martial Practice:
A View from the Top
By ROBERT EMMET QUINN*
HISTORY, it has been said, does not disclose its alternatives. Art
curator and historian, Marian McNaughten, has speculated that if
"just one of the two art academies in Vienna had accepted young
Adolph Hitler as a student, we might not have had WW IL."'1 What-
ever one may think of the present state of general and special courts-
martial,2 it would certainly have been different from what it is, had it
not been for the contributions to military practice which were made
by the United States Court of Military Appeals, the civilian "Supreme
Court" of the military justice system, the establishment of which was
described by Congress as the most "revolutionary" part of the 1950
Uniform Code of Military Justice.'
In the twenty years that have passed since the Uniform Code was
enacted, both military law and the thinking of military personnel in
the administration of the military justice system have undergone a
transformation of principle and attitude. The size and composition of
the armed forces undoubtedly contributed to the change. Further, the
frequent interactions between the civilian and the military communi-
ties, by way of the draft and reserve programs, certainly have played a
part. The Court of Military Appeals provided the constitutional un-
derpinning for the entire structure of change. It rejected the idea that
early military practice represented the "originar' understanding of the
framers of the Constitution that courts-martial were "instruments of
command," and that servicemen had no rights but those conferred by leg-
* Chief Judge, United States Court of Military Appeals.
1. Rigg, A Safe Here Houses Four of Hitler's Paintings, The Washington Post,
May 17, 1970 (Potomac Magazine), at 19.
2. The courts-martial system also includes the summary court-martial, a one-
officer court. By and large, the summary court has been outside the main stream of
critical review by the legal profession. This may be true because of the limited puni-
tive powers of the summary court-martial, which are materially less than those pre-
scribed in the Federal Criminal Code for "petty" offenses. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1
(3) (1964) with 10 U.S.C. § 820 (1964), UNiFoRm CODE OF MmrrARy JusTIcE art. 20
[hereinafter cited as UCMJ]. As early as 1953, however, it was noted that a con-
viction by summary court-martial is no "petty" matter, because it can increase the
punishment for a later "petty" offense to include a punitive discharge. Feld, The
Court-Martial Sentence: Fair or Foul, 39 VA. L. Rnv. 319 (1953).
3. H.R. REP. No. 491, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1949).
[201]
islative or executive favor.' The court recognized that military service
necessarily imposed restrictions upon individual freedom so that serv-
icemen did not have the same liberty of individual judgment and con-
duct as civilians, but it also recognized that in assuming the military
status, the serviceman did not lose his status as an American citizen.
"The time is long since past," it said, "when this court will lend an
attentive ear to the argument that members of the armed services are,
by reason of their status, ipso facto, deprived of all protections of
the Bill of Rights."5
Currently, established values and long-followed customs are un-
dergoing rigid testing throughout American society. The issues are
monumental, to the individual as well as to the country; and service-
men and women are as much affected by these issues as civilians. Their
minds and their emotions, their consciences and their wants, are as
intensely stirred as those of civilians by the Vietnam war, the conflict
between blacks and whites, the reexamination of our morals and our
social institutions, the reshaping of the electoral processes, and the
functional relationship between the individual and government. Their
personal convictions about these issues may be incompatible with a par-
ticular military duty or with the maintenance of good order and disci-
pline within the armed services, but personal conviction or conscience
which results in conduct not protected by a constitutional right may
constitute a violation of military law, and subject the individual to pros-
ecution by court-martial. If convicted, he may be separated from the
service with a punitive discharge.6 The difference between what was,
and what is now, is that today the test of the legality or illegality of con-
duct and the standard of rights and safeguards in prosecution begin
with the Constitution, not statute, military regulation, or military cus-
tom.
Below the level of constitutional protection, substantial changes
have been made in a number of important areas of procedure. Many
of these resulted from decisions of the Court of Military Appeals, and
4. Fratcher, Presidential Power to Regulate Military Justice: A Critical Study
of Decision3 of the Court of Military Appeals, 34 N.Y.U.L. REv. 861 (1959);
Weiner, Courts-Martial and the Bill of Rights: The Original Practice, pts. 1-2, 72 HARv.
L REv. 1, (1958).
5. United States v. Tempia, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 629, 633, 37 C.M.R. 249, 253
(1967). See also United States v. Manos, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 10, 37 C.M.R. 274 (1967);
United States v. White, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 211, 38 C.M.R. 9 (1967).
6. See, e.g., United States v. Noyd, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 483, 40 C.M.R. 195 (1969);
United States v. Howe, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 165, 37 C.M.R. 429 (1967); United States v.
Levy, 39 C.M.R. 672 (1968), petition denied, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 627 (1969).
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almost all of the changes have been subjected to critical analysis by
military personnel and civilians interested in courts-martial. The area
of military law that has probably received the greatest amount of at-
tention is that dealing with the relationship between the authority con-
vening the court-martial and the court-martial, an area popularly
termed "command control." The Court of Military Appeals has dealt
with this subject in a variety of forms. The problem of command con-
trol is, however, essentially one of the human factor in the administra-
tion of the law, not one of change in court-martial functioning.
More indicative of the special influence of the court on current
practice are the decisions in two areas: (1) those dealing with the
role of the Manual for Courts-Martial in military law, and (2) those
concerned with the status of the military judge. If no other changes
had been made, these alone would have imparted a different look to
the military courts.
The Role of the Manual for Courts-Martial in Military Law
Article 36 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice7 confers au-
thority upon the President of the United States to prescribe the "pro-
cedure, including modes of proof" for courts-martial. Pursuant to this
grant of authority, President Truman promulgated the Manual for
Courts-Martial, United States, in 1951.8 This Manual replaced sep-
arate manuals of practice that were in use in the several services. The
legislative grant of power and the President's execution of the power
were consistent with earlier law. Nevertheless, it is somewhat sur-
prising that Congress should have continued the pattern considering
that it had created a new civilian supreme court for the military justice
system. Since a decade earlier Congress had granted authority to
the United States Supreme Court to establish criminal rules of pro-
cedure for the federal district courts,9 it would have been appropriate to
confer the rule-making power for military courts upon the newly cre-
ated United States Court of Military Appeals. 10
Although promulgated by the President, the Manual was drafted
by a committee of military officers from the Army, Navy, and Air Force.
7. UCMJ art. 36, 10 U.S.C. § 836 (1964).
8. Exec. Order No. 10,214, 3 C.F.R. 408 (1970).
9. Act of June 29, 1940, ch. 445, 54 Stat. 688.
10. As early as 1956 it was proposed that the rule-making power be transferred
from the President to the United States Court of Military Appeals. Feld, Courts-
Martial Proceedings: Some Phases of Pretrial Procedure, 23 BROOKLYN L. REv. 25, 26
(1956). A similar proposal was made in 1959 by the American Legion. See Sher-
man, The Civilianization of Military Law, 22 MAINE L. REv. 3, 52 (1970). "
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The final draft of the committee was "reviewed and cleared by the
office of the Attorney General."" There is no published record of
the nature and scope of that review, but subsequent decisions by the
United States Court of Military Appeals, which invalidated various
provisions of the Manual, tend to indicate that the review was nei-
ther critical nor extensive.
Military practice before the Uniform Code had established the
respective service manuals as the "Bible" for courts-martial proceed-
ings. 2 This tradition was carried forward into proceedings under the
Uniform Code. It was soon apparent, however, that the Manual had
been drafted with too narrow a focus, and, as a result, it was materially
deficient in providing the essential rules of procedure. Indeed, the de-
ficiency was so great that one of its staunchest supporters was con-
strained to describe the interstitial areas of the Manual as an "un-
chartered sea."' 3  Equally apparent was the fact that the Manual went
beyond prescription of rules of procedure and modes of proof to de-
fine the scope and effect of the provisions of the Uniform Code and
the nature and elements of particular offenses. A curious paradox was
thus presented. On the one hand, in the area in which the Manual was
authorized and expected to speak with completeness and clarity, it was
frustratingly silent; on the other hand, in areas in which it had no
magistracy, it made sweeping pronouncements of principle. This
duality of approach produced two lines of decisions which altered both
the character of the Manual and the attitude of military practitioners
toward it.
The first line of cases dealt with the limited nature of the grant
of authority to the President. As noted earlier,'4 the grant extended
only to promulgation of rules of "procedure, including modes of
proof." Neither procedure nor modes of proof include definition of
the elements of an offense. It is not surprising, therefore, that soon
after the court began to hear appeals, it determined that the instructions
to the court members as to the elements of an offense in the form and
language of the Manual, did not, in several instances, 5 comply with
11. LEGAL AND LEGISLATIVE BASIS FOR THE MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL UNrrED
STATES at VI (U.S. Gov't Print. Off. 1951).
12. United States v. Drain, 4 U.S.C.M.A. 646, 648, 16 C.M.R. 220, 222 (1954);
United States v. Hemp, 1 U.S.C.M.A. 280, 285, 3 C.M.R. 14, 19 (1952).
13. United States v. McMahan, 6 U.S.C.M.A. 709, 719, 21 C.M.R. 31, 41
(1956) (Latimer, J.).
14. See text accompanying note 7 supra.
15. E.g., United States v. Ginn, 1 U.S.C.M.A. 453, 4 C.M.R. 45 (1952); United
States v. Welch, 1 U.S.C.M.A. 402, 408, 3 C.M.R. 136, 142 (1952).
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the mandate of article 51(c) of the Uniform Code, which required
that the court-martial be instructed "as to the elements of the of-
fense."'10 Since the Manual provisions were inconsistent with the Uni-
form Code, they could not be sustained. Yet, even while rejecting the
Manual's authority to define the scope of required instructions, the
court acknowledged the reverence of the services for the Manual; and
it specifically refrained from disapproving the then practice of allowing
the court members to refer to the Manual during their deliberation on
the accused's guilt or innocence. In United States v. Gilbertson,'
17
the court said: "We have no disposition to criticize referral [of the
court members] to the Manual for pertinent amplifying material after
full instruction on the elements [of the offense charged] has been
given."' 8 This policy of benign tolerance, however, did not long endure.
Within the next half-dozen years a substantial number of provi-
sions in the Manual were determined to be in conflict with, or an
inaccurate statement of, a requirement of the Uniform Code.19 By
1957, in United States v. Boswell," the Court of Military Appeals con-
cluded that the number of misstatements of law in the Manual and
the number of statements in it dealing with matters unrelated to pro-
cedure and modes of proof were too numerous to permit use of the
Manual by the court members during deliberation upon the accused's
guilt or innocence. A few months later, in United States v. Rinehart,"'
the court expanded Boswell to bar completely use of the Manual in
the courtroom by the court members. The reasons given by the court
for this momentous reversal of traditional practice merit quotation:
We cannot sanction a practice which permits court members to
rummage through a treatise on military law, such as the Manual,
indiscriminately rejecting and applying a myriad of principles-judicial and otherwise-contained therein. The consequences that
flow from such a situation are manifold. In the first place, many
of the passages contained therein have been either expressly or
impliedly invalidated by decisions of this Court. [Citing cases.]
Secondly, we have consistently emphasized the role of the law of-
16. UCMJ art. 51(c), 10 U.S.C. § 851(c) (1964).
17. 1 U.S.C.M.A. 465, 4 C.M.R. 57 (1952).
18. Id. at 468, 4 C.M.R. at 60.
19. See, e.g., United States v. Haynes, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 792, 27 C.M.R. 60 (1958);
United States v. Price, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 590, 23 C.M.R. 54 (1957); United States v. Kel-
ley, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 584, 23 C.M.R. 48 (1957); United States v. La Grange, 1
U.S.C.M.A. 342, 3 C.M.R. 76 (1952); B. FELD, A MANuAL OF COUrRTS-MARTAL PRAC-
rIcE AND APPEAL app. 1, at 164 (1957).
20. 8 U.S.C.M.A. 145, 23 C.M.R. 369 (1957).
21. 8 U.S.C.M.A. 402, 24 C.M.R. 212 (1957). It should be noted that the
president of a special court-martial is the presiding judge; as such he is authorized to
use the Manual in connection with procedural matters. Id. at 408, 24 C.M.R. at 218.
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ficer in the instructional area. In United States v. Chaput, 2
USCMA 127, 7 CMR 3, we said that, "It is fundamental that the
only appropriate source of the law applicable to any case should
come from the law officer." . . . Thirdly, the great majority of
court members are untrained in the law. A treatise on the law in
the hands of a non-lawyer creates a situation which is fraught with
potential harm, especially when one's life and liberty hang in the
balance. We have absolutely no way of knowing whether a court-
martial applied the law instructed upon by the law officer or
whether it rejected such instructions in favor of other material con-
tained in the Manual ...
In civilian practice it would constitute a gross irregularity to
permit jurors to consult outside legal references ...
We are fully aware that the change in the system of military
law occasioned by this decision represents a substantial departure
from prior service practices. However, we cannot but feel that
such change was imperatively needed if the system of military law
is to assume and maintain the high and respected place that it de-
serves in the jurisprudence of our free society.22
The second strand of decisions, which affected the image of the
Manual, dealt with the very area in which the Manual was intended
to be supreme, that is, procedure including the modes of proof. The
problem arose because the Manual was both deficient and inefficient
in effectuation of its purpose. Its principal fault was that it tried to be
an encyclopedia of military law, rather than a rule book of practice.
In the grant of authority to the President to promulgate appropriate
rules, Congress had suggested that the rules conform, as far as the
President deemed "practicable," to the principles of law and the rules
of evidence generally recognized in the trial of criminal cases in the
United States district courts.23 The rules of evidence received a fair
degree of attention, but important principles in other areas of pro-
cedure were barely noticed or completely disregarded.
Sensitive to the congressional preference for comparability of the
courts-martial system with the civilian practice, the Court of Military
Appeals bridged the large procedural gaps in the Manual pattern
with the rules applicable in the federal district courts. By 1954, the
court had propounded as dictum for general guidance the doctrine
22. Id. at 406-08, 24 C.M.R. at 216-18. It would be a mistake to conclude from
Rinehart that Manual discussions of substantive law were erroneous or useless. Many
of these were valuable aids to an understanding of the nature of military-type offenses.
See, e.g., United States v. Hemp, 1 U.S.C.M.A. 280, 3 C.M.R. 14 (1952). The 1951
Manual statement on the test for mental responsibility for conduct constituting a
crime has survived redefinitions of the test in the federal courts. See United States
v. Kunak, 5 U.S.C.M.A. 346, 17 C.M.R. 346 (1954); United States v. Smith, 5
U.S.C.M.A. 314, 17 C.M.R. 314 (1954).
23. UCMJ art. 36, 10 U.S.C. § 836 (1964).
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that "[f]ederal practice applies to courts-martial procedures if not in-
compatible with military law or with the special requirements of the
military establishment." '24 From then on, the Manual was not the
omniscient and omnipotent source of courts-martial practice. In fact,
in a number of instances, practices approved by the Manual were
found to be contrary to the Uniform Code of Military Justice.2" Forms
of relief available in the civilian courts, but unmentioned in the Man-
ual, were incorporated into the military practice. These included the
declaration of a mistrial,2 6 a motion for a change of venue,27 and a
motion to dismiss the charges for denial of the right to speedy trial.2"
Enlargement of the number and the nature of motions available
to an accused materially qualified the Manual statement that, with'
two specified exceptions, "the burden rests on the accused to support
by a preponderance of evidence a motion raising a defense or objec-
tion."29  Actually, the burden of proof applied by the court for a par-
ticular motion was the same as that applied in the federal district
courts. Thus, a motion to dismiss for denial of speedy trial imposed
upon the Government the burden of establishing that proceedings pre-
vious to trial had moved with reasonable dispatch. 30 Similarly, a
disputed question of fact as to the existence of military jurisdiction over
the accused or the offense cast upon the Government the burden of
establishing jurisdiction beyond a reasonable doubt. 31 A defense ob-
jection to withdrawal of the law officer (now the military judge) or a
court member after the accused's arraignment required the Govern-
ment to show good cause for the excuse.32
As the power to prescribe rules of procedure is reposed in the
President, the Manual for Courts-Martial continues to be the single,
most important source for the rules of practice. The 1969 Manual
made numerous changes and additions to the original rules promul-
24. United States v. Knudson, 4 U.S.C.M.A. 587, 590, 16 C.M.R. 161, 164
(1954); ci. United States v. Smith, 13 U.S.C.M.A. 105, 32 C.M.R. 105 (1962).
25. United States v. Jones, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 283, 22 C.M.R. 73 (1956); United
States v. Drain, 4 U.S.C.M.A. 646, 16 C.M.R. 220 (1954).
26. United States v. Schilling, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 482, 22 C.M.R. 272 (1957).
27. United States v. Gravitt, 5 U.S.C.M.A. 249, 17 C.M.R. 249 (1954).
28. United States v. Lamphere, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 580, 37 C.M.R. 200 (1967);
United States v. Hounshell, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 3, 21 C.M.R. 129 (1956).
29. Manual for Courts-Martial, United States 67(e) (1951).
30. United States v. Tibbs, 15 U.S.C.M.A. 350, 35 C.M.R. 322 (1965); United
States v. Brown, 10 U.S.C.M.A. 498, 28 C.M.R. 64 (1959).
31. United States v. Ornelas, 2 U.S.C.M.A. 96, 6 C.M.R. 96 (1952).
32. United States v. Boysen, 11 U.S.C.M.A. 331, 29 C.M.R. 147 (1960);
United States v. Grow, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 77, 11 C.M.R. 77 .(1953); UCMJ art. 29, 10
U.S.C. § 829 (1964).
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gated in the 1951 Manual. These changes directly reflect the influ-
ence of the Court of Military Appeals. In fact, the assigned mission
of the "working group" of the Army, Navy, and Air Force personnel
designated to draft a new Manual "was to make necessary and desir-
able revisions occasioned by decisions of the United States Court of
Military Appeals and other . . . applicable Federal authority. 33 Com-
menting on the scope of the alterations of practice effected by deci-
sions of the court, one student of the military justice system remarked
that these "accomplished more reform in the field of procedural due
process than all the prior congressional military codes put together."34
To the extent the statement implies that the court acted independently
of Congress and the Uniform Code, it is unjustified. The
court acted within the framework of the code and in furtherance
of congressional intent. A more appropriate comparison of influence
would have been in regard to the Manual. The 1969 Manual reflects
more the results of the court's decisions than it reflects the original
handiwork of the service personnel who drafted it.
Conjoined, the two lines of decisions by the Court of Military Ap-
peals achieved a fundamental change in the nature of the Manual.
From writ, it was transformed to a compendium of rules of pro-
cedure, which could (and should) be changed as good sense and le-
gal principle require, and which would, as nearly as practicable, con-
form to the rules in the federal district courts. The change trans-
formed the "unchartered sea" of courts-martial practice to a system
so significantly similar to that of the federal civilian courts as "to make
a civilian practitioner feel comfortable and knowledgeable in a court-
martial case.""3
The Military Judge and Courts-Martial
Before enactment of the Uniform Code a general court-martial, at
least in appearance and organization, bore more resemblance to a crim-
inal court in some civil law jurisdictions, in which a panel of profes-
33. ANALYSIS OF CONTENTS MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL UNITED STATES at iv
(U.S. Gov't Print. Off. 1969). The 1969 Manual retained several provisions of the
1951 Manual in unchanged form, although they were substantially affected by decisions
of the Court of Military Appeals. Compare MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED
STATES 95 (1969) with United States v. Dean, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 121, 23 C.M.R. 185
(1957). Compare MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES 67(e) (1969)
with text accompanying notes 26-28 supra.
34. Sherman, The Civilianization of Military Law, 22 MAINE L. REV. 3, 51 (1970).
35. Quinn, Some Comparisons Between Courts-Martial and Civilian Practice,
15 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 1240, 1242 (1968).
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sional and lay judges determined the applicable law and decided the
essential facts, than it resembled an American criminal court with a
judge and jury. After the reforms effected by the Elston Act in 1948,
at least one member of the general court-martial was required to be a
lawyer,3 6 but the court members could still, as indicated earlier,37 ob-
tain their law from the Manual for Courts-Martial. The Uniform
Code separated the professionally trained member from the other court
members and titled him the "law officer."38  Additionally, the code
conferred courtroom functions upon the law officer that were similar
to those of the judge in the civilian criminal court.3 9 Some years
later it was being asked, "Who Made the Law Officer a 'Federal
Judge?'- 40
As far as the title itself is concerned, Congress redenominated the
law officer a military judge in the Military Justice Act of 1968.41
However, in terms of function and independence at the trial, the trans-
formation was achieved considerably earlier through the decisions of
the Court of Military Appeals. In fact, as early as 1959, it was said
that the court had opened the way to trying a defendant before a law
officer sitting without court members, one of the major provisions of
the 1968 Military Justice Act.42
Practical recognition of the new role of the law officer appeared
in the Army as early as 1960 when the Army established the field
judiciary, an organization of officers in each of several circuits who
were designated by the Judge Advocate General of the Army for for-
mal appointment by the respective convening authorities within each
circuit.43  This practice was incorporated into the Uniform Code by
the Military Justice Act of 1968.
44
The historical record of the change has been partially treated
elsewhere. 45  A full review and analysis, from the enactment of the
Uniform Code to the investiture of the law officer with the judicial title
36. Selective Service Ast of 1948, ch. 625, tit. 1, § 206, 62 Stat. 629.
37. See text accompanying notes 17-18 supra.
38. Act of May 5, 1950, ch. 169, § 1 64, stat. 117.
39. UCMJ art. 51, 10 U.S.C. § 851 (1964).
40. Miller, Who Made the Law Officer a "Federal Judge"?, 4 MILITARY L.
REV. 39 (1959).
41. UCMJ art 1(10), 10 U.S.C. § 801 (10) (Supp. V, 1970).
42. B. FEL, A MANMAL OF COURTS-MARTIAL PRACTICE AND APPEAL 63 n.1 (1957).
43. See Weiner, The Army's Field Judiciary System: A Notable Advance, 46
A.B.AJ. 1178 (1960).
44. UCMJ art 26(c), 10 U.S.C. § 826(c).
45. Miller, Who Made the Law Officer a "Federal Judge"?, 4 MILITARY L. REV.
39 (1959).
January 1971] COURTS-MARTIAL PRACTICE
inherent in the office, may provide a worthwhile addition to the his-
tory of military justice. Here, it is important only to note that, along
with the evolution of procedure, the evolution of the law officer into
the military judge has rearranged the court-martiars structure and
operation. The 1969 Manual still confers upon the president of the
court-martial some responsibilities at trial that are not accorded any
juror in a civilian court. 6 This grant of authority may be an unneces-
sary concession to the past; however, the overall structure and opera-
tion of general and special courts-martial, with a military judge pre-
siding, now more nearly resembles the civilian criminal courts than
ever before in the history of military law. These courts now look
like and act as tribunals of the criminal judiciary of the Federal Gov-
ernment.
The Past as Prologue to the Future
Despite all the changes that have taken place in the military jus-
tice system during the past two decades, some remain unconvinced that
courts-martial are, or truly can be, a part of the federal judiciary. In
their view there is a basic and ineradicable incompatibility between
justice and military discipline-neither the military judge nor the court
members can be as impartial and just as a civilian judge and jury. As
surprising and as inconsistent as it may seem, some of the justices of
the United States Supreme Court apparently share this view. At the
same time, however, the Court has rejected a contention that a jury
composed exclusively of employees of the United States Government
is, because of attitudes engendered by employment and the effect of an
acquittal upon Government careers, likely to violate its oath of im-
partiality in judging the guilt or innocence of defendants charged with a
federal crime." The most recent expression of this attitude toward
the military courts was by Mr. Justice Douglas in O'Callahan v.
Parker."8 He said that a "court-martial is not yet an independent in-
strument of justice but remains to a significant degree a specialized
part of the overall mechanism by which military discipline is pre-
served." 9  With equal personal conviction, others take an opposite
view. 50
46. See MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES 40 (1969).
47. See Frazier v. United States, 335 U.S. 497 (1948).
48. 395 U.S. 258 (1969).
49. Id. at 265.
50. See United States v. Borys, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 547, 40 C.M.R. 259 (1969)
(Quinn, C.J., dissenting).
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Statistics of one kind or another have been used to bolster con-
flicting points of view. One set of figures compared the percentage of
acquittals to trials.51 Excluding prosecutions for unauthorized ab-
sence, which allow only few and mostly unusual bases of defense,52
the compilation indicated an acquittal rate of 4 percent in the federal dis-
trict courts compared to a 15 percent rate of acquittal in courts-martial.
Comparisons of this kind are, of course, meaningless. They may indi-
cate nothing more than a difference in the amount of or in the quality
of preparation by the prosecuting attorney. Equally unsatisfactory is
the approach to the character and quality of courts-martial predicated
upon personal experience; the test is too subjective to be more than
opinion.
Two circumstances provide relatively objective bases from which
to judge the essential character and quality of the current military
justice system. The first was noted by Yale Law Professor James W.
Bishop. He observed that, since the adoption of the Uniform Code, the
United States Supreme Court "has yet to find a fatal denial of consti-
tutional rights in a court-martial. 58  A second vantage point for
judgment is in a comparison of the rights and the protections of the
accused in a court-martial with those of the defendant in a civilian
prosecution. One of the most searching critics of the military system
has determined, in the light most favorable to civilian concepts, that
the defendant in the civilian court has "perhaps a slight edge' over the
accused in a court-martial. 54
A columnar balance of defense rights and privileges between
civilian and military law does not completely determine the quality
of the administration of criminal justice. In law, the prescribed pro-
cedures and roll of rights may be most impressive, but they do not
necessarily insure impartiality of verdict and sentence. Established
processes can be perverted. Certainly, there are persons in the mili-
tary who might be willing to subordinate justice to personal advance-
ment or to the imaginary needs of the armed forces; so are there
judges and prosecutors in the civilian community who are willing to
disregard the rights of a defendant to advance the supposed public
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zine), at 37.
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interest or their personal careers. Certainly, there are persons in the
military who may desire or knowingly attempt to deprive an accused of
rights to which he is entitled; so are there law enforcement officers and
judges in the civilian community who may also deprive the individual
of his rights. And certainly, from time to time an accused in the mili-
tary may be intentionally or carelessly denied a right or protection
granted him by the Constitution or other rule of law; similar depriva-
tions of right occur in the prosecution of crime in the civilian com-
munity. In short, people contribute to the quality of a system. The
nearly three million people serving in the armed forces are basically
the same as the two hundred million in the civilian community. They
are subject to the same human frailties and they are strengthened by
the same human virtues and values.
In the twenty years that have elapsed since enactment of the
Uniform Code of Military Justice and establishment of the United
States Court of Military Appeals, the military justice system has under-
gone great change. What courts-martial once were, they no longer
are. What courts-martial are now is not a mirror image of the fed-
eral civilian courts; but the procedures and the principles applicable
to courts-martial are, like those of the civilian courts, calculated to as-
sure a fair trial, a just verdict, and in the event of conviction, a sen-
tence appropriate to the particular accused. The decisions of the
Court of Military Appeals have contributed greatly to that felicitous
state of administration and operation.
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